Rent Control and Virtual Prices: A Case Study for Interwar Belgium
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After World War I rent control became a cornerstone of housing policy in many European countries, resulting in quantity constraints on the demand for housing. The theory on complete demand systems provides a framework for analyzing the effects of these policies on consumption. As a test case, a demand model is estimated to calculate virtual rent prices for intenvar Belgium. The results are well in line with historical evidence: providing insight into the extent of rationing. Simulations with the demand model show that the severe rent restrictions especially favored expenditures on food.
I n the nineteenth century, housing markets in western Europe were usually free of government control. World War I brutally disrupted the fragile equilibrium between the supply and demand of housing. Where the war was fought many houses were destroyed. Elsewhere, shortages of building materials, high mortgage rates, and uncertainty caused a sharp reduction in residential construction. The resulting housing shortage threatened to send rents sky high, so rent control became a cornerstone of housing policy, even in neutral countries.' Contrary to original expectations, rent control proved to be more than a temporary wartime measure. Postwar inflation and unanticipated difficulties in resolving the housing shortage delayed the removal of rent restrictions considerably. In Britain, the first steps towards deregulation of rents were taken in 1923, but decontrol only gained momentum in the 1930s; on the eve of World War I1 about 30 percent of all dwellings were still subject to rent restrictions.* In France rent control remained in effect until 1937.3 In many respects the interwar period can be considered the heyday of rent f r e e~e .~
The impact of rent control on the housing market is a much debated issue in economic research. Recently, it again has become a subject of controv e r~y .Ĩt is striking that in historical studies little use has been made of modern microeconomics in general and of so-called complete demand systems in particular to settle the debate. Using rents in interwar Belgium as a test case, we investigate in this article the effects of rent restrictions by calculating "virtual rents" on the basis of estimated demand models (what would the level of rents have been without control given the observed quantities?). After a short overview of rent control in interwar Belgium, we briefly discuss demand theories, without and with rationing. It is shown that both theories can be linked using the concept of virtual prices. The virtual price is the price the consumer would be willing to pay voluntarily for the actual quantity supplied. A demand model is estimated using Belgian interwar and post-World War I1 data. This provides the necessary information to calculate virtual rent prices, the size and evolution of which give a more precise insight into the extent of rationing. Finally, the demand model is simulated with alternative patterns for the controlled rent prices to analyze further the effects of rationing on consumption.
RENT CONTROL IN INTERWAR BELGIUM
Belgium is for several reasons an interesting case of rent control. During World War I about 84,000 houses, more than 5 percent of the housing stock, were completely or partially destroyed. At the same time, new construction came to an almost complete ~tandstill.~ The resulting housing shortage became acute after the armistice as the nearly 600,000 Belgian refugees in France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands returned home.' Surveys of housing conditions in the 1920s present a compelling picture of overcrowding. In many cases several households had to share a single-family dwelling.* Figure 1 illustrates the deterioration of housing conditions during and irnmediately after World War I.
In order to keep the situation under control, the Belgian Parliament decided in August 19 19 to extend leases and to limit rents to a maximum of 30 percent above the level reached in August 1914. A year later, in order to overcome the resistance of refractory owners, local authorities were authorized to claim unoccupied houses. As a sop to the owners, the limit for rent increases was in some cases raised to 50 percent of the August 19 14 level.9 Nevertheless, landlords continued to oppose rent control fiercely, and not surprisingly since consumer prices (rents excluded) had risen more than 350 percent over the same period. lo Why were rents in Belgium restricted to such a low level? Belgian offi%uyst, Economic History, pp. 188 ,222. 'Schepens, "Belgie, " p. 27. "obyn, "Woningnood, " p. 185; and Baudhuin, Histoire kconomique, vol. I , p. 103 . 'For a detailed overview of Belgian rent legislation, see Henau, "Belgische huishuren," pp. 10-17. ''Calculated from Banque Nationale de Belgique, Statistiques kconomiques, p. 40.
FIGURE I NUMBER OF FAMILIES PER HOUSE, BELGIUM, 1913-1939
Source: Data were calculated from Buyst, Economic History, pp. 26041,263. cials firmly believed that postwar inflation was essentially a temporary phenomenon. The government expected that prices would soon start to decline to prewar levels. ' l From that perspective permitting steep rent increases would only have hampered the success of deflationary policies. Of course, the Belgian government's aim to reduce the general price level by a factor of 4.5 was unrealistic. Moreover, as the government continued to pursue lax budgetary and monetary policies in the early 1920s, it soon thwarted its own drive towards deflation.12 From the middle of 1922, consumer prices (rents excluded) started to rise again, forcing Parliament to permit some limited rent increases (see Table 1 ).
The severe budgetary and monetary crisis of 1926 caused inflation to accelerate dramatically. As a result, the discrepancy between frozen rents and other consumer prices reached unprecedented heights. In October 1926 consumer prices (rents excluded) had risen 600 percent since August 19 14, while rent increases were limited to a maximum of 125 percent. In such circumstances, rent control, although originally designed to protect tenants, "van der Wee and Tavernier, Banque Nationale, pp. 33-36. 1 2~o r and Cassiers, Croissance, pp. more details, see Buyst et al., "National Table 1 ). l4 With effect from 1930, all compulsory extension of leases and rent restrictions would en&at least that was the intention. It turned out that a complete liberalization of rents was not feasible. In 1929 it was decided to continue rent control for some subcategories of class D dwellings. In exchange, a steep rent increase of 600 percent vis-a-vis August 19 14 was allowed, which in 1938 was finally raised to 700 percent. This short overview clearly indicates that especially in the 1920s the Belgian government intervened extensively in the housing market. To what extent were legal regulations obeyed? This is an important issue as approximately 65 percent of Belgian families were tenants in the interwar period.I5 Research suggests that in general rent control was well observed until 1924. Thereafter the discrepancy between the frozen rents and consumer prices apparently became too wide. The stepwise increases prescribed by the Rent Act of 1926 were sometimes ignored: from 1927 to 1929 rents of low-rent dwellings occasionally rose considerably faster than permitted.I6 Anne Henau's rent index takes this problem into account as it is based on records of landlords that indicate the actual rent paid (Figure 2 ).17In the 1930s the maximum limit of rent increases was high enough not to disturb the normal functioning of the market for low-rent dwellings.I8
Building activity responded swiftly to the decontrol of rents. The number of new houses constructed jumped from 27,000 per year between 1923 and 1927 to 35,000 per annum during the period 1929 to 1933. Information from land registry documents indicates that the average size of newly built houses also increased after the relaxation of rent control.I9
THE THEORY ON DEMAND SYSTEMS
The theory of complete demand systems provides a consistent framework to explain the allocation of a consumer's budget over different cornmodities." The microeconomic theory of consumption is built on the assumption that the consumer selects the best bundle that he can afford, given the available financial means and the observed prices. From this framework follows that consumption of each commodity xi is determined by the budget m and all the prices p , , p,, . . . ,p,
where n is the number of goods considered, m = (which is the sum of expenditures on individual goods has to equal total available means) andp "~e f o r e the 1947 census (61 percent tenants) quantitative information on Belgian housing tenure is lacking. Local inquiries suggest that the share of tenants was considerably higher in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ( Van den Eeckhout, "Belgium, " p. 197 
where Aln stands for the change in the logarithm of the variable. The parameter q iis interpreted as the income elasticity of commodity i, and eijthe elasticity of demand for good i with respect to the price of j. From the definition of the budget share wi =p&,/m and the budget restriction follows:
Substituting equation 3 in equation 2 and multiplying both sides with wi yields the so-called Rotterdam parametrization in differential form:
i An intercept ai is included to reflect trend shifts. The next explanatory variable equals the percentage change in nominal income minus a weighted sum of price changes and can thus be interpreted as the change in real income. Coefficient bi therefore represents income effects, as reflected in the expression for income elasticity qi=bilwi.Coefficient siigives the own compensated price effect while the sg (izj) give cross-price effects. The term compensated here means that real income is kept constant by adjusting nominal income after price changes.23 The sign of sijgives an indication of the direction of interaction between the commodities. When sg> 0, a price increase of good j results in an increased (compensated) demand for good i and the two goods are said to be substitutes; when su< 0 the commodities are complementary. The compensated price elasticities are calculated as sulwi,and the uncompensated price elasticities equal eii= (sii-biwj)/ wi. Notice that the elasticities are not constant in time since they depend on the variable budget shares.
The framework from which the demand equations are derived implies four types of restrictions. With the Rotterdam specification these restrictions can easily be imposed on the estimation, yielding an advantageous decrease in the number of coefficients to be estimated. The first set of constraints 21 To be more specific, equation 1 is derived from the first-order conditions of max,{u(x),subject to plx=m), where u(x) denotes the utility function. The demand function can be extended with other taste determining variables. 22See Barten, "Consumer Allocation," pp. 139-40; and Schokkaert and Van der Wee, "Quantitative Study," pp. 155--57.
23For infinitesimal price changes, holding real income fixed is equivalent to holding utility fixed, see Varian, "Microeconomic Analysis, " p. 144. concerns the adding-up conditions C,ai= 0, Chi= 1 and C g v= 0. These restrictions follow from the budget constraint: changes brought about ir expendilres on individual goods always have to sum up to the change in the total budget. Second, homogeneity is imposed with xjs, = 0. This implies the absence of money illusion: a proportional change in income and all prices does not affect the quantities consumed. Third, symmetry is expressed as su= sji. The (compensated) effect of a change in pjon xi equals the (compensated) effect of a change inpion xj.The fourth is the negativity condition on the matrix S. The main implication is that sii<O (Vi)meaning that (compensated) demand decreases following an own-price increase.
When the consumer cannot allocate his budget freely but is confronted with quantity constraints, the framework has to be adjusted to incorporate rationing effects.24 Suppose for simplicity that the quantity constraint is imposed for only one good: xh =
The quantities 2 of the 3, with p r i~e p , .~~ remaining n, goods can be freely chosen with corresponding price vectorp (from now on, p is an n,-vector, withoutp,). The constrained quantity 3, will have spill-over effects on demand for unrationed goods, as shown by the demand functions holding under rationing:26
The equivalent of the Rotterdam specification with rationing can be derived as (where time subscripts t are added):
where Git = pitfitl(mt -phtXht) (share in total uncommitted expenditures) Ti = rationing coefficient with ZiZi = 0
Similar theoretical restrictions hold on coefficients di, gi, Su, and Ti.
John Neary and K. W. S. Roberts showed the equivalence between demand models with and without rationing by defining virtual prices.27 The virtual price p, refers to that price that would induce an unrationed consumer to choose exactly the ration level voluntarily, or: 3, ==fh (&,p,ph) and zi =J; (&,p,Ph) =X(m,p,zh,ph) chase the observed bundle (f,R,). Or, abolishing the quantity constraint while changing the price to its virtual level would leave the optimal bundle unaffected and all markets would clear when supply is kept constant.
By means of the equalities in equation 7 one can show that the derivatives of rationed demand equations with regard to each of the exogenous variables can be expressed in terms of the derivatives of the corresponding free demand equations when evaluated at virtual prices.28 First, for the derivative with regard to the ration level holds that where the superscript c denotes compensated demand.29 By the law of demand the denominator is negative such that the sign of af:/%, is the opposite sign of that of ax,"ldp,. When the latter is positive (negative) goods i and h are substitutes (complements) and raising the ration level will de(in)crease good i's compensated demand.
Second, the effect of a change in nominal income can be decomposed into the normal income effect without rationing and a spill-over effect from rationing:30 a2,ldm = dx,ldm -(dx";la.Z,) (dx,ldm)
Normally ax, / a m > 0 and the sign of the spill-over effect depends on the substitute-complement relationship from equation 8. Finally, compensated price changes too under rationing have a direct and an indirect effect:31
The second term reflects that a change in the price of an unrationed good too affects the extent to which a consumer is tied down by the quantity constraint. These equalities imply that results on unrestricted demand functions can be employed to understand behavior under rationing. Calculation of the virtual price p, is an interesting exercise to assess the real extent of the rationing. In the next section estimation of a free (equation 4) and a constrained (equation 6) demand model is combined with equations 8 to 10 to compute the virtual price of rents in interwar ~e l g i u r n .~~ 28~ppendix 2 gives the expressions of these derivatives for the specific demand equations 4 and 6. 29This is equation 19 of Neary and Roberts, "Theory." 30~ompare equation 24 of Neary and Roberts, "Theory." 3'For example, see equation 28 of Neary and Roberts, "Theory." 3 2~h e models were estimated with the program DEMMOD; see Barten and Geyskens, "Negativity Condition," pp. 227-60. Technical details on the calculation of virtual prices can be found in Bettendorf and Barten, "Rationing." For data, see Table 2 and N.I.S., "Nationale Rekeningen," various issues. The computer program used is available from the authors on request. First, the Rotterdam model, equation 6, is estimated with per capita expenditure data for Belgium from 1920 to 1 9 3 9 .~~ Control of the housing market was assumed effective for the whole period in order to obtain sufficient observations. A problem of this choice is that years with a strict rent control are combined with years with less binding rationing. In order to check the sensitivity of the outcomes to the last years, experiments with smaller samples were performed. The smallest sample for which the procedure still converged consisted of the period 1920 to 1935. The resulting virtual prices turned out to be fairly robust to the number of observation^.^^ Methods that give smaller weights to years characterized by a less controlled housing market are thought to result in higher virtual prices.
Data on private consumption and spending on housing were classified into 8 aggregates (n,=7),as described in Table 2 . The relaxing of rent control is clearly mirrored by an almost tripling of the budget share of housing in the sample. The estimated coefficients and standard errors are found in Appendix 1; the implied elasticities evaluated for the mean share are reported in Table 3 . The income elasticities show that all goods were luxury items, except FOOD and HELI, and all demands were rather insensitive to own price changes. Remarkable is that the ration level for RENT is only significant in the CLCA-equation, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the quantity of housing reduces demand for CLCA with 5.6 percent. In this context, it is interesting to point out that Angus Deaton estimated a demand 33Whereas the theory deals with an individual consumer, this empirical part is applied to aggregated data. We assume that a representative household involves aggregation problems; in particular, the fact that households are affected to a different extent by rent control is ignored. Among others, the type of rationing scheme should be considered in an analysis with heterogenous agents, see Gould and Henry, "Effects," pp. 4 2 4 9 .
341n the smallest sample 1926 becomes an outlier. = Si,lGi(compensated own price elasticity) e,, = E : .
-qifli (uncompensated own price elasticity) y , = i,lG, (elasticity with regard to quantity RENT) where l i i is the mean share in total uncommitted expenditures. The coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 1. system under rationing with post-World War I1 British data.35 He found that an increase in rationed housing depressed food and clothing expenditure and stimulated spending on transport and communication.
The parameters of equation 4 describing behavior in the absence of rationing are estimated on data for the period 1953 to 1993 (see Appendix Table  2 ).36Clearly, the allocation of the budget differed between periods (see Table 2 ), as is also shown by the estimated average elasticities (see Table 4 ). HELI now has the highest income elasticity, whereas TRCO has become income inelastic (the negative income coefficient of RENT is not significant). The own price elasticities remain rather small.
On the admittedly strong assumption that the estimated demand model for the years 1953 to 1993 can be used to represent the behavior of an unrationed consumer in the interwar period, the estimated coefficients of both E" = sj/ W, (compensated own price elasticity) E ,. = E: , -qiwj (uncompensated own price elasticity) where w,is the mean budget share of Table 2 , last column. The coefficients are taken from Appendix Table 2. 35Deaton, "Theoretical and Empirical Approaches," p. 70. 36~etween 1945 and 1952 relatively strict rent controls were imposed again in Belgium. Therefore this period is left out of consideration (for more details, see Buyst, Economic History, pp. 233-34).
THE PRICES OF RENT IN LEVELS models can be used to evaluate the derivatives in equations 8, 9, and 10. For each year, these equalities can be considered as a system of equations in one unknown, p,. The value of P , that best fits this system is selected." As a simple alternative, virtual prices might be calculated by means of a single unrestricted demand equation for housing in the postwar period. However, this method does not make proper use of the analytical relationships nor of the information contained in the observed expenditures on other goods in the prewar and postwar periods. Experiments with this alternative have yielded poor results and the approach based on the two demand models was chosen.
The resulting virtual prices, as given in Figures 2, 3 , and 4, are well in line with the description of Section 2. Figure 2 shows that the level of virtual rent corresponds far better to the general price index (RENT excluded) than to the controlled price.38 The monetary crisis of 1926 is reflected in the highest increase in virtual rent in 1927 (+34.8 percent, Figure 3 ). While the observed price rose sharply in 1930 (50.5 percent), inflation rates of the virtual and the non-RENT price were already declining. The ratio of virtual to observed rent (solid line in Figure 4 Table 1 and Appendix Table 2 , increased and decreased by their standard errors, respectively. Figure 4 shows that the central ratio seems to indicate a lower bound for all years.39
Rent Control in Interwar Belgium
THE EFFECTS OF RENT CONTROL ON CONSUMPTION
The estimated restricted demand model can be used to simulate the effects of alternative rent control policies on cons~rnption.~~ In a "what-if' scenario, rent pricep, is assumed to change at the same rate as the general price index (rents excluded; see Figure 3 ) till 193 1 and is kept at the observed level from 193 1 onwards (see Table 5 , panel A). The ratio between the hypothetical and the observed rent price always exceeds one and evolves in line with the virtual ratio. Given the observed variables in 193 1, both quantities and 39Sincep,, is a nonlinear function of the coefficients, the relative position of each of the curves cannot be known a priori. Furthermore, Bettendorf and Barten, "Rationing, show that calculations based on the alternative CBS-specification of the demand model does not alter the pattern found for the virtual price.
40Pepermans, "De inkomens," pp. 320-22, has performed similar simulations but ignored rationing effects in the estimation. Comparing Pepermans's and our results should be done with care because of the use of different commodity classifications. However, Pepermans also concluded that the budget shares of FOOD and BET0 declined the most under constant total real consumption. In a first case, total nominal expenditures m are kept constant at observed values. Holding m and 2, constant, a higher p, causes a fall in total uncommitted expenditures, ranging from -14 percent to -3 percent. Since only income effects are involved and all unrationed goods have a positive income elasticity, the large increase in the budget share of RENTis compensated by a decrease in all other budget shares, especially of FOOD. As the relative increase inp, gets smaller, the effects on the budget shares diminish.
In a second hypothesis, the total nominal budget is changed to keep real consumption constant after the increase in rents. The necessary rises of m, ranging from 10 percent to 2 percent ( Table 5 , panel B), might be thought of as coming from an increase in government transfers, a rise in income or a decrease in savings. The rise in the budget share of RENT is smaller since its denominator rn now also increases. All other budget shares decrease, reflecting that the quantitities consumed rise less than the budget. Compared to the first case, the shares of income inelastic goods FOOD and HELI fall by even more since they benefit relatively less from the enlarged budget. The reverse holds for income elastic goods. These simulations show that the observed rent policies especially favored food consumption. These results are illustrated by historical evidence. In the early 1930s Belgian miners complained bitterly that the sharply rising budget share of rents forced them to cut back drastically on food e x p e n d i t~r e .~~ Of course, this was due not only to the effects of rent decontrol but also to the sharp increase in (temporary) unemployment and thus reduced income.
CONCLUSION
As in other western European countries, the Belgian housing market had rent controls in the 1920s. The large difference between the time path of rents and the general price level (rents excluded) together with the steep rise in rents after the liberalization of the housing market around 1930 suggest 42~riesen, "Zomerstakingen," p. 147. that rent restrictions in Belgium were very severe. Using a Rotterdam demand model, virtual rents were calculated. The ratio of virtual to observed rents reached 2.8 in 1920 and fluctuated around 2 in the period from 1923 to 1929. These figures not only confirm that Belgian rent control was extremely tight in the 1920s but also give a clearer picture of its trend over time.
A counterfactual exercise assuming that rents in the 1920s followed the general price index (rents excluded) instead of their actual course shows that the effects of rent restrictions on consumption were substantial. Assuming total nominal expenditure constant, the budget share of rents in 1920 would have been 13 percentage points higher than observed. The difference declined in the early 1920s but still remained around 9 percentage points in the period fi-om 1922 to 1928. The budget shares of all other spending categories benefitted from rent control, especially the consumption of food. By accident, liberalization of the Belgian housing market coincided with the outbreak of the Great Depression. At the same time that income came under severe downward pressure, rents rose substantially. As a result, the budget share of rents increased dramatically, thereby crowding out spending on all other items. The derivatives of the restricted and unrestricted demand equations can be expressed in terms of the coefficients as follows (the latter are evaluated at the virtual variable^):^^ 
